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This paper presents an overview of the technologies and the methodologies used in Network 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (NIDPS). Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
System (IDPS) technologies are differentiated by types of events that IDPSs can recognize, by 
types of devices that IDPSs monitor and by activity. NIDPSs monitor and analyze the streams 
of  network  packets  in  order  to  detect  security  incidents.  The  main  methodology  used  by 
NIDPSs is protocol analysis. Protocol analysis requires good knowledge of the theory of the 
main protocols, their definition, how each protocol works. 
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Introduction 
Increasing  size  and  complexity  of  the 
Internet  and  Intranet  networks  have  led  to 
increasing  number  of  vulnerabilities  that 
could  be  exploited.  Thus,  the  internal  and 
external attacks on the information systems 
are increasing at an alarming rate. Also, these 
are becoming more severe and sophisticated. 
The attackers find ingenious ways to bypass 
the security controls and to compromise the 
security  and  the  well  functioning  of  the 
information systems. They are motivated by 
financial, political, and military objectives. In 
this  context,  defending  wide  area  networks 
from  malicious  traffic,  unauthorized  access 
to systems involves many problems.  
In  security  information  systems  Network 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
(NIDPS)  are  important  tools  to  detect 
possible incidents and also, to attempt to stop 
them in real time. Due to changing attacks, 
intrusion  detection  methodologies  and 
technologies  continuously  evolve,  adding 
new detection capabilities, to avoid detection. 
They must adapt to new forms of malware, to 
the public networks, increased traffic. 
 
2 Concepts of Intrusion Detection  
An  intrusion  is  a  successful  action  to  gain 
access  to  an  information  system,  to 
compromise it or to make it unavailable. This 
is  possible  due  to  the  presence  of 
vulnerability in the target system that can be 
exploited by a motivated intruder. 
Intrusion  Detection  and  Prevention  is  the 
process  of  monitoring  the  information 
systems by sensors or agents and analyzing 
the  collected  information  to  detect  and  to 
attempt  to  stop  the  attacks  in  real  time, 
identifying  vulnerabilities,  the  violation  of 
security  policies  or  standard  security 
practices.  
An  Intrusion  Detection  and  Prevention 
System  (IDPS)  is  a  tool  that  monitors 
information  systems,  collects,  analyzes 
information, and initiates responses when an 
intrusion is detected.  
Intrusion  Detection  Systems  (IDSs)  mainly 
work  as  defensive  mechanisms.  They  only 
alert  the  system  administrators  that  an 
incident has occurred.  Intrusion Prevention 
Systems  (IPSs)  can  take  some  actions  to 
attempt to stop the attack, such as breaking 
the  connection  or  modifying  the  firewall 
rules  to  deny  access  to  the  intruder.  The 
response of the classic IDS can be slow if the 
system  administrator  is  busy  while  the 
response  of  the  IPS  is  automatic.  An 
architecture that uses together IPS and IDS 
technologies is the best solution for defense 
in depth. 
Conceptually,  a  generic  IDPS  consists  of 
modular  components.  It  mainly  has  the 
following  components:  monitoring  system, 
storage, analyzer, and responder. 
  Monitoring system – monitors and logs 
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the  events  in  a  computer  system  or 
network; 
  Storage – stores information, called audit 
record,  about  suspicious  activities  or 
intrusions;  also,  the  security  policies 
used in analysis are stored; 
  Analyzer  –  uses  different  analysis 
methodologies to detect the incidents; 
  Responder – the response mechanism of 
incidents. 
The IDPSs could be classified as: 
  By detection methodology [12], [18]: 
-  misuse-based detection 
-  anomaly-based detection 
-  stateful protocol analysis 
  By activity [12]: 
-  network-based 
-  wireless-based 
-  network behavior analysis 
-  host-based 
  By behavior on detection:   
-  passive 
-  active 
  By collection and analysis frequency: 
-  continuous 
-  periodic 
The  detection  methodologies  describe  the 
characteristics of the analyzer.  
Misuse-based  detection  [18]  represents 
known attacks in the form of a pattern or a 
signature.  The  main  issues  in  misuse 
detection methodologies are how to make a 
signature  that  encompasses  all  possible 
variations of an attack, and that do not also 
match normal behavior. 
Misuse-based detection can be implemented 
by the following techniques [18]: 
  rule-based  intrusion  detection  –  the 
attacks are represented as rules of if-then 
form;  
  model-based reasoning system [18] – the 
attack scenarios are stored in a database; 
the anticipator searches attack scenarios 
in audit trail and generates the next set of 
hypothesized  behaviors, that it passes to 
the planner; the planner determines the 
likelihood  of  occurrence  them  in  the 
audit trail; if the likelihood is high the 
scenarios accumulate; 
  state transition analysis –the attacks are 
represented  as  a  sequence  of  state 
transitions,  from  initial  state  to 
compromised  state,  of  the  monitored 
system; 
  key  stroke  monitoring  –  an  attack  is 
identified  by  user  key  strokes 
registration; 
  pattern matching model – the signatures 
of  known  intrusions  are  represented  as 
patterns  that  are  compared  with  audit 
trail.  This  approach  considers  intrusion 
signatures  –  patterns,  audit  trails  – 
abstract event streams, detector – pattern 
matching. 
Anomaly-based detection considers that the 
intrusive activities are anomalous. This is the 
process  [12]  of  comparing  the  profiles  of 
normal behavior against real activity of the 
system to identify significant deviations. The 
profiles are developed by monitoring the real 
activity  of  users,  hosts,  networks  or 
applications over a period of time, called a 
training period, and preservation of what is 
considered  without  intrusion.  The  profiles 
can be static or dynamic.  
Stateful  protocol  analysis  uses  protocol 
model, the IDS sensors perform full protocol 
decoding  for  some  application-layer 
protocols.  The  process  [12]  compares 
profiles of normal protocol activity for each 
protocol state against observed events in the 
system to identify deviations. The “stateful” 
[12] means that the IDPS can understand and 
can track the state of network, transport and 
application a protocols. 
There  are  four  main  groups  of  IDPS 
technologies [12]: 
Network-Based  [12]  -  monitors  network 
traffic for network segments or devices (e.g. 
packets  captured  by  network  interface  in 
promiscuous mode) and analyze the network, 
transport and application protocol activity to 
identify  possible  attacks  originating  from 
outside or inside of the system. 
Wireless  [12]  which  monitors  wireless 
network  traffic  and  analyzes  its  wireless 
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Network  Behavior  Analysis  (NBA)  [12] 
which  examines  network  traffic  to  identify 
unusual traffic flows. 
Host-Based  is  installed  locally  on  host 
machine and monitors the characteristics of 
the host and events occurring with that host. 
It  analyzes  network  packets  entering  and 
leaving  the  host,  log  files  on  the  host, 
processes  running  on  the  host,  attempts  to 
execute  malicious  code.  It  checks  the 
integrity  of  system  files,  files  access  and 
modification,  CPU  usage.  By  the  type  of 
audit data they analyze, there are operating 
system–level intrusion detection systems and 
application-level intrusion detection systems. 
The  first  three  are  network  intrusion 
detection  technologies.  Network-based  is 
older  while  wireless  and  network  behavior 
analysis are newer and have been  developed 
due the increasing complexity of networks. 
 
3 Network Intrusion Detection 
Primary  source  of  a  Network  Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention System (NIDPS) is 
network  traffic.  In  the  network  traffic  the 
data is passed through the layers from source 
to  destination.  The  four  TCP/IP  layer  are: 
hardware layer, internet protocol (IP) layer, 
transport layer, application layer. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The TCP/IP Model; Source: [19] 
 
A  typical  component  NIDPS  [12]  is 
composed  of  sensors,  one  or  more 
management  servers,  multiple  consoles  and 
optionally one or more database servers. 
Sensors – monitor and analyze the activity. 
The  sensor  can  be  an  appliance-based  –  a 
specialized hardware and sensor software or 
software  only.    An  appliance-based  sensor 
includes  specialized  NICs  and  NIC  drivers 
and  specialized  processors  that  assist  in 
analysis.  
Sensors  can  be  deployed  in  the  following 
modes [12]: 
- Inline – network traffic can pass directly 
through  a  NIDPS  –  Figure  2.  This  is  by 
definition  active  as  it  can  inspect  every 
network  packet  and  react  in  real  time  on 
dangerous activities, e.g. dynamically block 
network  traffic  that  it  believes  to  be 
malicious. Some inline sensors can be hybrid 
firewall/IDPS  devices  but  can  be  specific 
IDPS.  
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-  Passive  –  monitors  a  copy  of  the  actual 
network traffic  –  Fig.  3.  It  monitors traffic 
using a network tap or spanning port [12].  
-  Network  Tap  (Test  Access  Port)  –  is  a 
direct connection between a sensor and the 
physical network media itself, such as a fiber 
optic or copper cable. Fiber Taps [16] split 
the network signal into two streams, enabling 
to  the  network  and  monitoring  devices  to 
receive  the  signal.  The  signal  must  be 
regenerated to have adequate strength. 
- Spanning port [12]  – which is a port of a 
switch that can see all network traffic going 
through  it.  If  a  switch  is  configured  or 
reconfigured  incorrectly,  is  under  heavy 
loads, its spanning port might not be able to 
see all traffic. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Passive NIDS 
 
Generally,  intrusion  prevention  techniques 
require  that  the  sensors  be  deployed  inline 
mode because the passive sensors monitor a 
copy  of  traffic  and  cannot  easily  break  the 
connection. They still can place packets onto 
network  in  order  to  disrupt  network 
connection  but  such  method  is  more 
cumbersome  and  less  effective. 
Administrators must decide where the IDPS 
sensors  should  be  located  consistent  with 
security needs. 
Most  NIDPSs  mainly  rely  on  protocol 
analysis.  The  types  of  attacks  detected  are 
[12]:  
  network  layer  attacks  –  spoofed  IP 
address, illegal IP header length. The IP, 
ICMP, IGMP protocols are analyzed; 
  transport layer attacks – port scanning, 
unusual  packet  fragmentation,  SYN 
floods. The TCP and UDP protocols are 
analyzed; 
  application  layer  attacks  –  buffer 
overflows, format string attacks, malware 
transmission.  Mainly,  these  protocols:  
DNS,  FTP,  HTTP,  IMAP,  IRC,  POP, 
SMTP are analyzed; 
  policy  violation  –  use  of  inappropriate 
Web sites or use of forbidden application 
protocols. 
Network-based  IDPSs  [12]  cannot  detect 
attacks  within encrypted network traffic, as 
virtual  private  network  (VPN)  connections, 
HTTP over SSL (HTTPS), and SSH sessions. 
The analysis must be performed on payloads 
within encrypted network traffic, thus IDPSs 
analyze the payloads before it is encrypted or 
after it is decrypted. However, some IDPSs 
can also monitor encrypted communications 
to  identify  known  vulnerabilities  or 
misconfiguration.   
Network-based IDPSs [12] may be unable to 
perform  full  analysis  under  high  loads, 
especially  if  stateful  protocol  analysis 
methods are in use. To prevent its disability it 
uses  high-bandwidth  network  cards,  limits 
the number of simultaneous connections, sets 
timeouts to expire connection state. 
Also,  various  types  of  attacks,  such  as 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, 
and  anomalous  activity  can  attempt  to 
exhaust  a  IDPS  sensor’s  resources  and  to 
make them unavailable. 
The first methodology was the development 
of  simple  signatures  [13],  patterns  to  be 148    Informatica Economică vol. 17, no. 1/2013 
searched  in  traffic.  In  the  initial  concept, 
string  matching,  each  signature  is  written 
for key phrases or commands associated with 
a known attack. It creates a list of signatures.  
An incoming packet [13] is compared, byte 
by  byte,  with  each  signature  for  particular 
characteristic of malicious traffic, and when 
there is a match, an alert is generated. Then 
the next packet is read into memory and the 
process begins again.  
Another  concept  is  protocol  analysis.  In 
“protocol analysis” [9] the IDS sensor uses 
definition of protocols and understands how 
various  protocols  work.  At  each  layer  of 
TCP/IP model [19], the packet consists of a 
header of its own and data, sometimes known 
as the payload. 
 
  Data 
 
  Data 
 
  Data 
 
Fig. 4. Packet; Source: [19]  
 
There  are  IDS  signatures  that  focus  on  IP, 
TCP,  UDP  and  application  layer  protocol 
header value [8]. Any header value can be 
used in signatures, but  the most commonly 
used  header-related  signature  elements  are 
[8]: 
  source  and  destination  IP  addresses 
(particularly  reserved,  non-routable,  and 
broadcast addresses) 
  port  numbers  in  TCP  or  UDP  protocols 
(port scanning attacks) 
  header length 
  unusual packet fragmentation 
  particular TCP flag combinations in TCP 
headers 
  the protocol field in IP headers (enables to 
distinguish among TCP scans, UDP scans 
and  ICMP  scans,  SYN  flooding  attacks 
and UDP flooding attacks) 
  checksum 
  Time to Live (TTL) 
  ICMP  types/codes  that  should  not 
normally be seen 
There are some of the header values clearly 
abnormal, so they make great candidates for 
signatures. Classic examples are: 
  TCP packet with the SYN and FIN flags 
simultaneously set[7]; 
  TCP packet with the SYN, FIN and PUSH 
flags  simultaneously  set  [19];  It  is 
anomalous  because  a  SYN  flag  starts  a 
connection, a FIN flag closes a connection 
and  PUSH  flag  sends  data  while  a 
connection is opened; 
  no TCP flags [19]– if the TCP flag byte 
field has a value of 00. A byte TCP flag 
byte  field  is  represented  as  two 
hexadecimal  characters  or  nibbles.  The 
high-order nibble contains two of reserved 
bits  for  ECN  (RFC  3168)  and  the  bit 
settings  for  URG,  ACK  flags.  The  low-
order nibble contains  the bit settings  for 
the  PSH,  RST,  SYN  and  FIN  flags.  00 
means that no TCP flags have been set. A 
normal TCP flag byte has at least one flag 
bit set; 
 
        0     1    2    3    4    5    6     7    8    9    10  11  12  13  14   15    
     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ 
      |  Header Length  |       Reserved     | 
CWR| 
ECE | 
URG| 
ACK | 
PSH | 
RST| 
SYN | 
FIN |      
     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ 
 
Fig. 5. Header Length and TCP flags – TCP segment; Source: [19]  
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  TCP flag byte field with a value greater 
than  3  indicates  that  one  or  both  of  the 
reserved  bits  are  set  (ACK=1=>  2
0=1, 
URG=1=>  2
1=2  =>  1+2=3).  Any  value 
greater  than  3  in  high-order  nibble  is 
anomalous unless ECN is being used [19]. 
ECN  is  a  technique  for  reducing 
congestion  in  a  network.  ECN  traffic 
should  have  a  non-zero  value  in  the 
differentiated  services  byte  (formerly 
known as the type of service byte); 
  a bad TCP header length [19] is when the 
specified  TCP  header  length  is  greater 
than the actual TCP segment (header and 
data)  length.  The  value  of  the  TCP 
segment length can compute by subtracts 
the IP header length from the IP datagram 
total length; 
  ACK  flag  isn’t  set  and  the 
acknowledgment  number  has  non-zero 
value [7]; 
  URG flag isn’t set and urgent pointer field 
has non zero values [7]; 
  the normal IP header with no options is 20 
bytes (IP v.4), or five 32-bit words. An IP 
header that might contain a dangerous IP 
option such as source routing would have 
a  length  of  greater  than  5  found  in  this 
field [19]; 
  unknown IP protocol number in IP header 
[22]; 
  connection  attempt  from  a  reserved  IP 
address; it checks the source address field 
in an IP header [7]; 
  traffic  sent  to  broadcast  address  from 
outside  network  [19].  The  broadcast 
address  has  a  final  octet  255  or  0.  The 
destination address field is found in bytes 
16 through 19 (32 bits) of the IP header, 
so the byte 19 of the IP header must be 
different from  0  or  255.  For example, a 
malicious  host  sends  many  ICMP  echo 
requests  with  a  spoofed  source  IP  (IP 
address  of  the  victim  host/network)  to  a 
broadcast  address  of  an  intermediate 
network.  The  intermediate  network  must 
allow  inbound  broadcast  traffic.  All  the 
live  hosts  in  the  intermediate  network 
send ICMP echo reply to the victim host, 
because they believe it’s the sender. If the 
intermediate  network  has  many  hosts 
and/or the target host has a slow Internet 
connection, can occur a denial of service 
attack on target host; 
  the  own  network’s  MTU  (maximum 
transmission unit) is smaller than the size 
of  the  IP  datagram  and  DF  (Don’t 
Fragment) flag is set [19] (to discover the 
MTU some hosts send across the network 
a datagram with the DF flag set, and the 
MTU  of  the  network  that  required 
fragmentation  is contained in the ICMP 
error message ); 
  malicious  fragmentation  [19]. 
Fragmentation  provides  a  field  of  action 
for  attackers,  them  using  to  mask  and 
facilitate  their  exploits.  Malicious 
fragmentation  occurs  in  many  different 
forms. It uses malicious fragmentation to 
exhaust system resource in some kind of 
denial-of-service  attacks,  degradation  of 
service or disabling of the target host, to 
evade  detection  or  circumvent  the 
monitoring and filtering devices incapable 
of fragments reassembly. It requires good 
knowledge of the fragmentation theory to 
detect  malicious  fragmentation  and 
recognize  normal  fragmentation.  IDPSs 
detect and analyze fragmented traffic and 
discover malicious fragmentation [19]: 
-  fragmentation  the  20-bytes  TCP 
header (the normal TCP header with no 
option  has  20  bytes)  in  multiple 
fragments  in  an  attempt  to  avoid 
detection; 
-  creation  of  the  fragments  with 
overlapping  offset  fields  –  exploits 
weaknesses in the reassembly process 
of  fragments;  When  these  fragments 
are reassembled at the destination host 
some  systems  will  crash,  hang  or 
reboot; 
- the length of the last IP fragment was 
changed [22]; 
- a large number of IP fragments can 
lead to denial of service [22]; 
- while not illegal, IP fragments smaller 
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-  can  cause  a  denial-of-service  by 
repeatedly  sending  a  non-zero  offset 
fragment to a host. 
  the source and destination ports are set to 
21 ( FTP servers). In normal FTP traffic, it 
sets  a  high  port  number  (greater  than 
1023)  as  the  source  and  port  21  as  the 
destination [7]. 
Because  ICMP  and  UDP  [8]  protocols  are 
connectionless  it  checks  each  packet.  The 
TCP protocol is connection-oriented. In this 
case [8], address and port are constant in all 
packets  in  the  connection  and  they  can  be 
checked  once,  but  TCP  flags  should  be 
different among the packets in the session, so 
it will check every packet. 
A header-based signature could include any 
one  or  more  characteristics.  The  simple 
signatures are more prone to false positives 
while the more complex signatures are prone 
to false negatives. An example: two or more 
characteristics  can  occur  separately  in 
legitimate  traffic  but  combined  in  same 
packet are very low.  
It can create a signature set based on known 
exploit  programs  or  known  and  potential 
vulnerabilities.  The  signature  set  based  on 
known exploits has the disadvantage that will 
be a significant delay between the time the 
exploit  occurs  and  the  time  the  IDPS  can 
recognize  its  activity.  This  signature  set  is 
written after the exploit has become public. 
A  signature  set  based  on  protocol  analysis 
has the advantage of looking for any signs of 
abnormal or suspicious activity by checking 
various fields for abnormal values. Abnormal 
values for fields protocols can be used only 
in the presence of existing vulnerabilities. By 
using the protocol analysis techniques there 
will be much better detection of known and 
unknown attacks, it will be more difficult for 
attackers  to  evade  through  change  to 
exploits’ code or NIDPS obfuscation.  
Above there is a static analysis. For better 
performance dynamic protocol analysis [8], 
[20]  is  required.  TCP,  UDP  and  ICMP 
headers and payloads are contained inside the 
payload of IP packets. In order to get TCP 
header data, for example, it must parse the IP 
payload. Other protocols such as FTP, DNS, 
HTTP,  SMTP,  IMAP,  POP3  are  contained 
inside  payload of  UDP  or TCP packets.  In 
this  case,  it  must  parse  two  levels,  IP  and 
UDP or TCP, in order to get to them. For this 
there  are  analyzer  trees  [20].  For  each 
connection the system identifies the protocol 
used and activates the appropriate analyzer. 
Each  intermediate  node  receives  data, 
analyzes it and passes the transformed data to 
the  appropriate  analyzer.  By  a  dynamic 
processing it can add, change or remove the 
analysis component. 
A superior and flexible NIDPS should [20]: 
  use multiple ways to recognize protocols; 
  enable  multiple  protocol  analyzers  to 
work in parallel; 
  choose  the  appropriate  protocol  analyzer 
in incorrect classification cases; 
  can dynamically decapsulate tunnels; 
  enable  high-speed  analysis  by 
performance. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Dynamic protocol analysis; 
Source: [20] 
 
Only  more  advanced  NIDPSs  perform  full 
protocol decoding, protocol analysis requires 
much  more  advanced  IDPS  sensors 
capabilities  than  the  simple  signature 
technique.  Protocol  analysis  techniques 
monitor  traffic,  recognize  a  particular 
protocol performing full decoding, validate it 
and  alert  when  traffic  does  not  meet 
expectations.  Protocol  analysis  techniques 
examine  the  header  values  and  payload 
values.  
For example [9], protocol analysis to identify 
an  attempt  to  exploit  buffer  overflow 
vulnerability  in  FTP  MKD  command, 
verifies the length (that it isn’t overly long) 
and  the  content  (that  doesn’t  contain  shell 
IP  TCP  SMTP 
IMAP 
POP3 
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code)  of  the  argument  of  the  MKD 
command. 
A  simple  NIDS  evasion  method  is  Path 
Obfuscation [10] – alters the path so, it has 
different appearance but the same meaning. 
The  advanced  NIDPSs  protocol  analysis 
based detect  and stop  these  types  of attack 
because  they  perform  much  of  the  same 
processing  as  a Web server, FTP  server or 
operating system. 
For example [10]: 
  character escaping; So, id and i\d have the 
same meaning; 
  using  excessive  whitespace,  including 
TAB and new line. If an attacker creates a 
SQL injection attempt using DROP 
  TABLE, the NIDPS should ignore the 
additional spaces; 
  using  the  backslash  instead  of  slash  in 
URL should be treated as slash; 
  single-dot sequence – when ./ combination 
is used in a path, it does not change the 
meaning.  So,  the  NIDP  treats  the 
windows/./system32  as 
windows/system32; 
  path transversal – such as /../ . So, if the 
attacker  uses 
windows/sample/../system32, NIDPS  will 
wipe  out  sample,  considering 
windows/system32; 
  hex  encoding  –  so,  %20  is  the  hex 
encoding equivalent of a space, %5c is the 
hex  encoding  equivalent  of  backslash, 
%2e is the hex encoding equivalent of dot. 
%5c%2e%2e is path transversal; 
  unicode – so (HTML entity), @ is &#64; 
and  dot  is  &#46; 
name1&#64;domain1&#46;com  is 
name1@domain1.com. 
Thus,  to  circumvent  the  attack  attempts 
described  above  the  advanced  NIDSs 
protocol analysis based perform these [10]: 
  examine  IP  packet  header  to  find  IP 
protocol  number.  IP  protocol  number  6 
corresponds to TCP protocol; 
  examine TCP packet header to find TCP 
destination port number. If it is port 80, 
this indicates that the user is sending an 
HTTP request to the server; 
  perform  HTTP  protocol  analysis  parsing 
the  HTTP  request  all  component, 
including the URL’s path; 
  process  the  URL  path  by  handling  path 
obfuscation,  hex  encoding,  double  hex 
encoding, or unicode; 
  generate  an  alert  if  an  attack  attempt  is 
found. 
The  evasion  methods  can  be  combined  to 
create an advanced evasion technique. Thus, 
two or more evasion techniques of different 
network layers can be combined. Two ways 
of  advanced  evasion  techniques  are 
metamorphic and polymorphic malware [15].  
In both cases the code is different and more 
sophisticated  with  each  iteration  to  avoid 
detection.  The  polymorphic  malware  code 
has two parts; one part remains constant with 
each  iteration.  For  example,  if  viruses,  a 
virus have a virus decryption routine (VDR) 
and an encrypted virus program body (EVB). 
In this case, it is easier to provide a complex 
signature  to  identify  the  constant  part.  The 
metamorphic  malware  is  more  difficult  to 
detect. For its detection advanced techniques 
[15]  are  used,  such  as  generic  decryption 
scanning,  negative  heuristic  analysis, 
emulation  and  access  to  virtualization 
technologies. 
In  order  to  detect  the  attacks,  a  traffic 
normalizer [14] should be placed in path of 
traffic  and  to  normalize  the  packet  stream. 
The normalizer should remove the potential 
ambiguities.  Thus,  the  NIDPSs  monitor 
normalized traffic. 
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By  protocol  analysis-based  as  superior 
intrusion  detection  solution  the  packets  are 
examined  in  detail,  using  the  protocol 
definitions and making the same processing 
as  a  Web  server,  FTP  server  or  operating 
system. By this method a much wider range 
of attacks can be detected, including known 
and unknown attacks. 
Web  or  FTP  servers  usually  run  on  well-
known  port  numbers.  In  static  application-
layer protocol analysis standard port numbers 
for protocols are used. But, there are Web or 
FTP  servers  that  run  on  other  ports  with 
benign  or  malicious  intent,  and  also,  non 
Web servers run on 80/tcp in order to evade 
security  monitoring.  The  attackers  [20]  use 
application  protocols  on  non-standard  ports 
or  on  ports  assigned  to  other  protocols: 
Trojans that use non-standard ports; botnets 
use  the  IRC  protocol  on  ports  other  than 
666x/tcp;  hidden  FTP  servers  for  file-
distribution  on  ports  other  than  21/tcp. 
Therefore,  a  dynamic  protocol  analysis 
approach  [20]  examines  a  per-connection 
data  structure  to  identify  what  analysis  to 
perform for the flow. For example [20], if the 
destination port for a TCP SYN packet is 80, 
the  NIDS  should  perform  IP,  TCP,  and 
HTTP analysis for all packets of the flow. If 
the  payload  of  a  packet  on  port  80/tcp  - 
initially  analyzed  as  HTTP  -  looks  like  an 
IRC session, it  replaces the HTTP  analysis 
with IRC analysis. 
To identify whether traffic on standard ports 
uses the appropriate protocols [20] the NIDS 
should  examine  traffic  in-depth,  by 
decapsulating tunnels. There are few systems 
that can perform this [20]. Such a system is 
[20] McAfee’s IntruShield. For example, this 
can  unwrap  the  SSL-layer  of  HTTPS 
connections. 
It  presents  below  an  example  of  HTTP 
signature (Bro) [20]: 
 
signature http_server {   # Server-side signature 
ip-proto == tcp              # Examine TCP packets. 
payload /ˆHTTP\/[0-9]/  # Look for server response. 
tcp-state responder  # Match responder-side of conn. 
requires-reverse-signature http_client   # Require client-side sign. as well 
enable "http"  # Enable analyzer upon match. 
} 
signature http_client {   # Client-side signature 
ip-proto == tcp   # Examine TCP packets. 
payload /ˆ[[:space:]]*GET[[:space:]]*/   # Look for requests [simplified] 
tcp-state originator   # Match originator-side of conn. 
} 
 
Another example is a signature (Snort) for a 
Telnet login failure [13]:  
 
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> 
$EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"TELNET Bad  
Login";  
content: "Login failed"; nocase;  
flow: from_server, established; 
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:492; rev:5;)  
 
Thus,  the  analysis  engine  searches  “Login 
failed”  string  in  the  payload  and  if  this  is 
found an alert is generated. 
In  “protocol  analysis”  [9]  NIDPS  sensors 
perform  full  protocol  decoding  for 
application  layer  protocols,  such  as  DNS, 
FTP,  HTTP,  SMTP.  Thus,  they  have  the 
ability  to  detect  both  known  and  unknown 
types of attacks. 
In  the  stateful  protocol  analysis  [11] 
approach  the  NIDPS  sensor  monitors  and 
analyzes all of the events for the duration of a 
session  and  adds  stateful  characteristics  to 
the protocol analysis. It records information 
about  the  connection  state.  The  NIDPS 
performs  correlations  among  the  events 
occurred and the state of the network, among 
different events over a connection. Thus, the 
sensors  can  detect  attacks  that  cannot  be 
recognized by another way. 
Common types of state are [17]: 
  connection  state:  for  every  active 
connection,  the  NIDPS  sensor  records 
information  like  duration,  status  of  the 
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  per-host  state  -  such  as  connection 
attempts from a source address to detect 
scanners; 
  signature state - for signatures that so far 
have only partially matched. 
There  are  two  new  approaches  for 
application-layer protocols analysis [20]: 
  statistical analysis of the traffic within a 
connection  –  uses  an  analysis  of 
interpacket  delays  and  packet  size 
distribution  to  distinguish  interactive 
applications  like  chat  and  file  transfer,  
distinguish  Web-chat  from  regular  Web. 
For  this,  it  uses  statistical  analysis, 
machine  learning  components,  decision 
trees or neural networks; 
  locating protocol-specific byte patterns in 
the  connection’s  payload  or  signatures 
that can be used to determine components 
of  an  HTTP  request  or  an  IRC  login 
sequence.  
One  of  the  simplest  ways  to  use  state  in 
application-layer  protocols  analysis  is  to 
associate every response with the request 
that  generated  it  [11]  over  a  connection. 
The NIDPS sensors that use stateful protocol 
analysis for detection can do this. 
An example is the server’s response of a FTP 
command [11]. At an attempt to access a FTP 
server it returns a numeric code that indicates 
the status of the response. A 2xx FTP status 
code  indicates  that  the  command  has 
successfully  completed,  while  a  5xx  FTP 
status code indicates that the command was 
not  successful,  and  the  error  is  permanent. 
Thus, it can recognize brute force attacks, by 
identifying many failed requests in a session. 
2xx status code in the response shows that an 
attacker attempt was successful.  
Another example of state is the phases of a 
session [11]. The phases of an FTP session 
are  [11]:  connection,  authentication, 
transaction  and  disconnection. 
Unauthenticated  users  should  only  perform 
providing  usernames  and  passwords.  If  the 
user  has  authenticated  successfully,  the 
session is in authenticated state and the user 
can  perform  specific  commands,  such  as, 
change  directory,  list  the  contents  of  the 
directory,  delete  files,  delete  a  directory, 
make  a  new  directory,  copy  files.  If  these 
commands  are  performed  in  the 
unauthenticated state it can be an attack. 
Because  the  deep  packets  inspection  (the 
header  and  the  payload)  is  hard  or  even 
impossible,  the  flow-based  intrusion 
detection  is  a  current  option  studied  [2]. 
With  such  approach,  the  communication 
patterns  within  the  network  are  analyzed, 
instead of the contents of individual packets. 
The  flow-based  intrusion  detection  uses 
flows  for  input  data,  instead  of  packets.  A 
flow  [4]  is  defined  as  a  set  of  IP  packets 
passing an observation point in the network 
during a certain time interval. A TCP flow 
corresponds to a single network connection, 
while  a  UDP  flow  is  a  stream  of  packets 
terminated  by  an  inactivity  period.  This 
information is in the form of Netflow [3] or 
IPFIX [4].  
The flow is mainly characterized by [2], [3], 
[4]: 
  source and destination IP address; 
  source  and  destination  port  number  for 
TCP and UDP; 
  protocol field of IP header. 
Also, the following parameters are important: 
  Type of Service (Diffserv, ECN) value; 
  TCP flags of TCP headers; 
  packets size; 
  flow size. 
The  flow-based  detection  should  be 
combined  with  packets  inspection  in 
detection  process  [2],  [5],  [6].  At  the  first 
stage flow-based can be used to detect certain 
attacks.  At  the  second  stage,  packet 
inspection  can  be  used  for  suspicious 
activities  previously  discovered.  This 
combined technique is used especially for the 
analysis of high-speed networks. It applies to 
DoS, scan, worm, spam, botnet detection.   
Accounting flows is a two-step process [2]: 
flow  exporting  and  flow  collection.  These 
tasks  are  performed  by  two  components: 
flow exporter  and  flow collector.  The  flow 
exporter,  also  known  as  observation  point 
creates  flow  records  from  observed  traffic. 
The flow collector retrieves the flows created 
by  the  flow  exporter  and  stores  them  in  a 
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analysis. The analysis of exported flow data 
for  intrusion  detection  can  be  decomposed 
into three principal steps [6]: 
  flow data is received from the monitoring 
devices and decoded; 
  the  flow  data  is  normalized  and 
preprocessed  in  order  to  provide 
appropriate  input  to  the  detection 
algorithm; 
  applies a detection algorithm in order to 
discover network intrusions.  
The detection algorithms can be [6]: 
  threshold-based - that uses predefined or 
adaptive thresholds for specific measures; 
  principal  component  classifiers  (PCC)  – 
the set of flows are decomposed into their 
components  and  the  algorithms    detects 
anomalies in multivariate time-series; 
  outlier detection algorithms – uses a set of 
normal  data  to  the  learned  normal 
behavior; an outlier is a data point which 
is very different from a normal data; 
  rule  learning  algorithms  -  that  learn 
classification  rules  from  training  data 
containing,    labeled  normal  and  attack 
data. 
A  flow-based  method  of  detection  is 
subspace method, detailed in [1]. With this 
method  the  traffic  flows  (IP  flow)  are 
aggregated  at  the  Origin-Destination  (OD) 
level. It uses samples of flow data from every 
router. Sampling is random, capturing 1% of 
packets  entering  every  router.  Sample 
packets  are  characterized  by  5-tuple,  IP 
address and port number for both source and 
destination,  and  protocol  type.  In  each 
sampled  IP  flow  it  is  also  recorded  the 
number of bytes and packets. The OD flow 
can be represented as a sum of normal and 
anomalous  components,  x=
^x  + 
~x.  It 
examines  three  distinct  representations  of 
sampled flow traffic, as time series of bytes, 
packets  and  IP  flow,  all  indexed  by  the  5-
tuple  headers.  Each  anomaly  results  in  a 
value of the  ||
~x||
2 
 that exceeds the threshold 
statistic.  The  set  of  anomalies  is  cast  as 
triples of (traffic type, time, OD flow), where 
“traffic  type”  is  one  of  Bytes  (B),  Packets 
(P), or IP-Flows (F). It aggregates all triples 
with  the  same  time  value,  placing  some 
triples into the new categories BP, BF, FP, 
and BFP. Thus, a BP anomaly is one that is 
detected in both byte and packet time series 
at  the  same  time.  It  groups  triples  to  form 
anomalies  in  space  (all  OD  flows 
corresponding  to  the  same  traffic  type  and 
time) and time (all triples with consecutive 
time  values,  having  the  same  traffic  type). 
Finally,  a  set  of  anomalies  results.  Each 
anomaly  is  due  to  a  set  of  anomalous  OD 
flows.  Thus,  it  detects  the  network-wide 
traffic  anomalies,  by  aggregating  sampled 
flow measurements at the origin-destination 
level. 
The  paper  [21]  proposes  a  combination  of 
timeslot-based and flow-based analyses in 
network anomaly detection.  
A first approach is a combined method using 
the timeslot-based and flow-based in parallel. 
Network traffic is inputted to both detectors 
and  analyzed  by  each  detector.  Because,  a 
large buffer storage in a flow-based analysis 
represents a problem, to reduce the amount 
of  data  to  be  analyzed  by  flow-based 
analysis,  a  packet  of  sampling  and  setting 
short timeouts was made. The method has the 
disadvantage that it may result a lack of the 
information  needed  to  detect  anomalous 
flows. To avoid this, timeslot-based analyses 
have  been  proposed  in  the  first  stage  and 
flow-based analyses in the second stage. The 
timeslot-based  detection  has  two  modules, 
header-based detection module and payload-
based  detection  module.  Also,  in  timeslot-
based detection, firstly, each slot is classified 
based on a threshold (Thac), into anomalous 
slot  candidate  and  normal  slot.  For  normal 
slots the detector does not transmit anything. 
By another threshold  (Thas),  the anomalous 
slot candidates are classified into anomalous 
slots  and  suspicious  slots.  For  anomalous 
slots,  the  timeslot-based  detector  triggers 
alerts. For suspicious slots, in a second stage 
(flow-based analysis) is performed a detailed 
analysis.   
 
4 Conclusion 
There  are  many  ways  to  achieve  network 
security  and  NIDPS  are  a  complement  to 
them. Good knowledge of the networks, how Informatica Economică vol. 17, no. 1/2013    155 
the  protocols  work,  network  threats  and 
vulnerabilities  lead  to  a  strong  defense  in 
depth. So when it makes a mistake or gets 
sloppy, it leaves a hole that attackers find and 
exploit.  NIDPS  must  recognize  attacks  so 
that their exploitation can be prevented.  
Good  knowledge  of  methods  and 
technologies incorporated into every product 
leads  to  a  good  choice  of  products 
implemented since each product has its own 
detection  capabilities  and  every  computer 
system  has  specific  threats  and 
vulnerabilities. Depending  on  the degree of 
appropriateness  between  the  informatic 
system  and  the  NIDPSs,  a  more  or  less 
effective  and  complete  activity  of  a 
monitoring and control results.  
All  the  methodologies  combine  in  modern 
products,  exploit  inherent  strengths  of  each 
approach  and  prevent  the  weakness  from 
leading to a superior product.  
Network intrusion detection systems have a 
number  of  fundamental  limitations.  Many 
systems have a very high false positive rate, 
they  are  vulnerable  of  evasion  attacks, 
denial-of-service  attacks.  Therefore  they 
must be improved. They must adapt to new 
types of attacks, to achieve the security and 
protection  of  networks  and  computer 
infrastructures. It is clear that using dynamic 
protocol  analysis  increases  the  number  of 
security breaches that can be detected. 
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